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ABSTRACT
The war on drugs is widely criticized as unjust. The idea that the laws 
prohibiting drugs are unjust can easily lead to the conclusion that those 
laws do not deserve our respect, so that our only moral reason to obey them 
flows from a general moral obligation to obey the law, rather than from 
anything morally troubling about drug use itself. 
In this paper, I argue that this line of thinking is mistaken. I begin by 
arguing that the drug laws are indeed unjust. However, so long as they 
remain prohibited, I argue that we have strong moral reasons to avoid drug 
use. First, drug users are partly responsible for the violent and exploitative 
conditions in which many drugs are produced and distributed. Second, 
the unequal ways in which drug laws are enforced make drug use by many 
an unethical exercise of privilege. These reasons do not depend on the 
existence of a general moral obligation to obey the law; we ought to refrain 
from illegal drug use even if prohibition is unjust and even if we have no 
general obligation to obey the law. In fact, drug laws turn out to represent 
an interesting exception case within the broader debate about this 
obligation, and I argue that it is the very injustice of the law that generates 
the reasons not to violate it.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Is it unethical to use illegal drugs? According to one way of thinking about 
this question, the answer depends on our views about the ethics of 
obedience to the law. We might think drug use is unethical because it is 
1 Thanks to Lisa Farlow, the audience at the 2014 Canadian Philosophical Association 
meetings at Brock University, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal for helpful 
comments on previous versions of this paper.
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illegal, on the grounds that it is (typically) unethical to break the laws of a 
just state. On the other hand, we might think that drug prohibition is 
unjust, and therefore does not command our obedience. 
There is, however, another way of thinking about the question. Rather 
than focusing on the ethics of drug use through the lens of the law, we 
might think instead of recreational drugs as popular consumer products. 
Considered in this way, we can ask whether the purchase and consumption 
of illegal drugs is unethical, in much the same way we can ask whether it is 
ethical to purchase any other consumer product. Many consumer goods 
are produced in harmful, exploitative, or environmentally damaging ways, 
and this raises important moral worries for consumers. The 2013 Rana 
Plaza garment factory collapse in Bangladesh, for instance, brought the 
ethics of low-cost clothing into public consciousness; animal welfare 
activists have long argued that factory-farmed meat is unethical; and the 
environmental costs of gas-powered SUVs, for example, make them targets 
of moral critique.
This way of asking about the ethics of drug use does not presume that 
the most important element in the answer is their legal status. Nonetheless, 
I argue that, considered simply as consumer products, we have strong 
moral reasons to refrain from the use of recreational drugs so long as they 
remain illegal. This is not because we have strong moral reasons not to 
break the law, but rather because drug prohibition contributes in an 
important way to the conditions that do make the purchase and use of 
recreational drugs unethical. 
Section 2 argues that drug prohibition is unjust. For some, this means 
that the drug laws do not deserve our respect, and so drug use is not a 
significant moral issue. However, section 3 goes on to argue that so long as 
drugs remain illegal, there are strong moral reasons to avoid using them. 
This is for two distinct reasons. First, drug users are partly responsible for 
the violent and exploitative conditions in which many drugs are produced 
and distributed. Second, the unequal ways in which drug laws are enforced 
make use by many into an unethical exercise of privilege. 
The fact that drugs are legally prohibited plays an important role in this 
argument, since the harmful conditions of production and distribution 
and the unequal enforcement are both generated by prohibition. However, 
the argument does not depend on the existence of a general moral 
obligation to obey the law: Section 4 argues that we ought to refrain from 
illegal drug use even if prohibition is unjust and even if we have no general 
moral obligation to obey the laws of a just state. In fact, drug laws turn out 
to represent an interesting exception case within the broader debate about 
this obligation. Regardless of whether we have such an obligation, we have 
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strong moral reasons not to violate drug laws. Finally, Section 5 considers a 
range of potential objections to the argument. 
Paradoxically, the very reasons that make drug laws unjust also give us 
strong moral reasons not to use illegal drugs. Our strong moral reasons to 
avoid drugs arise not in spite of the injustice of the drug laws, but rather 
precisely because of those laws; in the absence of prohibition, drug use would 
be, at the very least, much less immoral (and perhaps not immoral at all). This 
gives us a reason both to avoid drugs while they are illegal, and to seek to 
overturn the prohibition of drugs, whether or not we wish to use them. 
2. THE INJUSTICE OF PROHIBITION
There are many arguments that drug prohibition is unjust. Some claim 
that drug use is a 'victimless crime', and so prohibition interferes with 
liberty. Others point to the hypocrisy of governments banning most drugs 
out of a professed concern for health while permitting – and profiting from 
– the sale of alcohol and tobacco. While drugs can be very unhealthy, so 
too are many things that governments do not control with criminal 
sanctions (Husak 2002, 2005). These arguments are powerful, but they are 
not my main focus.2 Even if we set aside concerns about liberty and 
hypocrisy, existing drug laws are unjust because of the considerable harms 
they generate. 
Drug prohibition is often justified on the grounds that drugs are harmful 
to users’ health. Drug use can indeed cause significant harms, including 
death, and one powerful idea supporting prohibition is that it reduces 
overall rates of drug use, and so protects potential drug users from serious 
harm. However, proponents of the ‘harm reduction’ approach to drugs 
often point out that prohibition can exacerbate the health problems it is 
intended to address. Prohibition does not put an end to drug use; in fact, 
the evidence from Europe suggests that it does not even effectively reduce 
drug use, since decriminalization does not contribute to an increase in 
drug use (Vuolo 2013). What prohibition does do is marginalize drug users, 
making them more vulnerable and less able to access health care and other 
social services. It can therefore increase the negative health impacts of 
drug use, even when rates of drug use decline (Drucker 1999). Advocates of 
harm reduction therefore frequently advocate for decriminalization in 
order to reduce the health impacts of drug use. If the justification for 
2  Two potential objections are that: 1) some liberties can be justifiably restricted to 
achieve important social goods, and drug prohibition may be an example of such a justified 
restriction; and 2) inconsistencies can be resolved in more than one way. Perhaps the real 
problem is the legal status of alcohol, not the prohibition of other drugs.
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prohibition is that it protects health, and if, as the evidence seems to 
suggest, it actually contributes to worse overall health outcomes, then 
prohibition, with all of its attendant costs, is unjustified. 
These costs are significant, and affect many more people than drug 
users. In fact, these costs are so significant that there are good reasons to 
think that prohibition would be unjustified even if it did succeed it its aim 
of protecting the health of potential drug users. 
First, prohibition creates an illegal black market for the production and 
distribution of drugs, and this black market is remarkably violent. Between 
2006 and 2010, for example, the war between drug cartels and the Mexican 
government killed at least 41,648 people and perhaps tens of thousands 
more.3 Much of this violence is a direct result of existing drug laws. The 
trade is not governed by contracts, disputes cannot be dealt with in the 
courts, and because it is illegal the drug trade is (for some) incredibly 
profitable. These facts combine to incentivize violence.  Repealing drug 
laws and ending the War on Drugs might not completely eliminate drug-
related violence, since even legal markets can attract violence. Nonetheless, 
the evidence strongly suggests that prohibition significantly increases that 
violence (Werb et al. 2010).
Second, violent crime is not the only social cost of the drug trade. Those 
who work in the drug trade are workers: they are employed in a large and 
profitable economic sector. Because it is illegal, those workers face the risk 
of violence without protection from contract law, labor law, employment 
insurance, or workers’ compensation. They are therefore open to serious 
exploitation, and are generally poorly paid: American drug dealers often 
earn less than minimum wage in a very dangerous occupation (Levitt and 
Venkatesh 2000). If the exploitation of Bangladeshi garment workers gives 
us pause, the exploitation of Mexican and North American drug workers 
made possible by prohibition should as well. 
Third, drug workers and users face significant risks of incarceration, 
which, even more than drug-related violence, is the direct result of 
prohibition. In 2015, there were close to 300,000 people incarcerated in 
American for drug crimes (Carson and Anderson 2016), and another 
947,000 on probation (Kaeble and Bonczar 2016), for a total of more than 1.2 
million Americans with their autonomy significantly restricted because of 
3 For the lower estimate, see (Rios 2013). For a discussion of the criticisms of this 
estimate, see (Cave 2012).
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drug prohibition.4 Since this number excludes most drug-related violent 
crime, it likely under-reports the number of people incarcerated because of 
drug prohibition. Moreover, incarceration does not just impose a cost on 
drug offenders: it is costly to the state, since housing so many prisoners is 
extremely expensive. Government money spent on the drug war is money 
that cannot be spend on other valuable government programs, and such 
opportunity costs should be counted among the real costs of the drug war. 
If the drug laws are not justified, then many of these costs are not justified 
either. 
Fourth, those convicted of drug crimes suffer real harms in addition 
to incarceration. In many jurisdictions, released felons lose voting rights 
and the right to sit on juries. They also lose access to public housing, 
federal student loans, federal health and welfare programs, and food 
stamps (Alexander 2010: Ch. 4). If they were employed, they typically lose 
their jobs, and face reduced economic opportunities upon their release, 
as employers can deny jobs to those convicted of a crime. 
Finally, drug laws are enforced in an unjust way. Despite roughly 
similar rates of drug use, African-Americans are arrested for drug crimes 
at a much higher rate than whites, a difference that cannot be explained 
by the differing nature of drug offending between races (Mitchell and 
Caudy 2015). For example, African-Americans make up 13.3% of the US 
population, but 38.3% of those in federal prison on drug changes; white 
(non-Hispanic) Americans, by contrast, are 62% of the US population but 
only 21.6% of those in federal prison on drug charges (Taxy et al. 2015). 
This means that African Americans are nine times as likely as white 
Americans to be in federal prison on drug convictions. The injustice of 
the racial disparity in drug law enforcement compounds the social costs 
of incarceration. It is not merely that drug offenders are imprisoned, lose 
their political rights, and suffer economic and social dislocation, though 
these are serious costs. It is also that these costs are born disproportionately 
by already disadvantaged racial minorities. This has led Michelle 
Alexander, among others, to compare drug laws to the Jim Crow laws, 
which were used to deny African-Americans housing, jobs, and 
democratic rights (2010). The racial disparity in enforcement makes 
African-American communities poorer, more vulnerable, and less 
politically influential. Drug laws therefore play an important role in 
4 The 298,704 people in state and federal prisons on drug charges in 2015 represented 
a relatively small percentage – under 20% – of those incarcerated in America (Carson and 
Anderson 2016), and so as John Pfaff points out (2017), drug prohibition cannot explain the 
phenomenon of mass incarceration. Nevertheless, the overall American incarceration rate 
is so high that the drug crime incarceration rate is higher than the total incarceration rate in 
many countries, including Germany and Canada (Wagner and Walsh 2016). 
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perpetuating the systematic racism in American society.
All told, then, drug laws carry enormous social costs. If these costs are 
to be justified, they should be outweighed by corresponding social 
benefits. While the exact effect of prohibition on the rate of drug use and 
the health-related harms of drugs is a complex question, those who aim 
to reduce the health costs of drug use frequently argue in favor of 
decriminalization or legalization rather than prohibition. But even if this 
is a mistake, and it turns out that prohibition does reduce the rate of use 
and the health-related harms of drugs, these benefits need to be balanced 
against the other enormous costs associated with prohibition. Those 
costs – including violence, worker exploitation, mass incarceration, 
community dislocation, and systematic racism – significantly outweigh 
whatever marginal reduction in drug use or health costs might be gained 
by prohibition. As a result, the legal prohibition of drugs is unjust. 
3. MORAL REASONS TO AVOID ILLEGAL DRUGS
I’ve argued that drug prohibition is unjust. But what are the moral 
implications, for individuals, of this claim? The most obvious one is that 
we ought to work to repeal prohibition, including pressuring our political 
representatives to abandon the War on Drugs. Some jurisdictions have 
taken steps in that direction. In 2001, Portugal decriminalized simple 
possession of all drugs: drug users are directed to treatment, and punished 
with, at most, a small fine. Drug dealing, however, dealing remains 
criminalized. Recreational use of marijuana is legal in Uruguay, in eight 
American states and the District of Columbia, and the government of 
Canada has committed to the legalization of marijuana by July of 2018. 
At present, however, the wholesale legalization of drugs is politically 
unfeasible in almost every country. Given the injustice of those laws, it is 
tempting to suppose that they simply do not have any claim on our respect, 
and so that drug use is not particularly morally objectionable. 
There are certainly perfectly good non-moral reasons not to take drugs. 
First, many illegal drugs carry serious health risks. These risks may not be 
a good reason to outlaw drugs – in fact, they may be a good reason not to 
outlaw drugs – but they can be a very good reason not to take drugs. Second, 
given the drugs are illegal, in buying and using drugs one runs the risk of 
criminal sanction, including prison. As we saw, this is a non-negligible risk 
for members of underprivileged groups. However, both of these reasons 
are prudential. It may be in our self-interest to avoid illegal drugs, but do 
we have a moral reason to refrain from purchasing and consuming them? 
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I argue that illegal drug use is indeed immoral. The prohibition of drugs 
is certainly unjust. Nonetheless, the current prohibition drugs gives us two 
distinct moral reasons to not violate drug law. First, drugs are produced 
and distributed in ways that are unethical. Second, the use of drugs by 
many consumers represents an objectionable form of privilege. Moreover, 
we have these moral reasons to avoid drugs, not merely in spite of the law’s 
injustice, but rather because of it. Paradoxically, it seems, it is precisely the 
injustice of the laws banning drugs that makes violating those laws 
immoral. 
3.1 Unethical production 
The harm reduction approach to drugs endorses treating them much like 
other dangerous consumer products. This is an argument for repealing 
prohibition, but thinking of drugs as consumer products has other moral 
implications. After all, we have strong moral reasons to avoid consumer 
products that are produced in unnecessarily dangerous and exploitative 
ways. For example, we ought to avoid purchasing clothing that is made is 
dangerous sweatshops or by child labor. Ethically produced clothing might 
be more expensive, but cost savings for relatively affluent consumers do 
not justify the exploitation and deaths of Bangladeshi garment workers. 
The drug trade, as we saw, is violent and exploitative: drug workers are 
killed and exploited in significant numbers. We ought therefore to avoid 
drugs for the same reason that we ought not to buy clothing made in 
dangerous sweatshops; both are produced in dangerous and exploitative 
ways, and consumers both enable and benefit from that exploitation. The 
point it is not merely that we could do something to prevent the harms of 
the drug trade, though this is certainly true. Rather, the point is that drug 
users are in an important sense directly responsible for those harms. It is 
their demand for drugs that allows the harms of the drug trade to persist. 
Drug users are not, of course, solely responsible for those harms, since 
governments who enforce prohibition share in the blame. Nonetheless, 
given the reality of prohibition, drug users are blameworthy for the harms 
that their consumption choices help to bring about. The many affluent 
North Americans and Europeans who insist on purchasing ethically 
produced, organic, and fair-trade consumer goods should also avoid illegal 
drugs, since the reasons we have to avoid such drugs are of a piece with the 
more general moral reason we have to avoid all unethically produced 
products. 
However, these moral reasons to avoid illegal drugs are arguably 
stronger than they are for most unethical consumer goods. First, compared 
to other unethically produced goods, the drug trade combines significantly 
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greater harms with significantly fewer consumers. Almost everyone in 
North America and Western Europe wears clothing every day. The majority 
likely own some clothing produced in an unsafe and exploitative sweatshop. 
By contrast, around half of North Americans have never used illegal drugs,5 
and under 10% use them regularly.6 Nonetheless, despite the much smaller 
size of the illegal drug market, drug-related violence kills many more 
people than die in unsafe garment factories. The collapse of the Rana Plaza 
in April 2013 killed 1,129 Bangladeshis, mostly garment workers, and a 
factory fire in 2012 killed another 117. These numbers are alarming, but 
they pale in comparison to the thousands of Americans and tens of 
thousands of Mexicans killed in drug violence since 2006. This is not to 
minimize the harms of the garment industry, but instead to highlight the 
enormous harms caused by the drug war. To the extent that those who buy 
drugs or unethically produced clothing are implicated in the harms 
associated with their production, those who buy drugs are much more 
implicated, since the far greater harms are spread across a much smaller 
number of customers. 
Second, there are institutional differences between the harms resulting 
from the drug trade and from unethical garment factories. The harms of 
the drug trade are a direct product of the criminal laws: it is because drugs 
are illegal that there is so much violence and exploitation in their production 
and distribution. The harms of the garment industry, by contrast, emerge 
in large part from a global economic system in which multinational 
corporations seek to maximize profits by manufacturing goods in countries 
that have low labor costs, and correspondingly low labor standards and 
protections. 
This is an important difference, since the criminal law is under 
democratic control in ways that global economic institutions are not. 
Americans cannot simply end prohibition by voting for a party that 
promises to do so; there is no such party and in any case American (and 
other) democratic institutions are structured so that majority public 
5  In 2015, 50% of Americans over the age of 25 reported using illicit drugs at least 
once in their lives. By far the most commonly used drug is cannabis, with 46% reporting 
lifetime use. Cocaine and hallucinogens, both at 16%, were next on the list of lifetime 
prevalence. Only 2% have ever tried heroin (NIDA 2015a). Canadian numbers are similar: in 
2012, 43% of Canadians reported lifetime use of cannabis, though that number drops to 
34.7% when one-time users are excluded (Rotermann and Langlois 2015). Numbers from 
Mexico are less reliable, but a 2008 WHO survey put lifetime cannabis use by Mexicans at 
7.8%, and lifetime use of cocaine at 4% (Degenhardt et al. 2008).
6 In 2015, 13% of Canadians reported using illegal drugs in the previous year, a 
number that falls to 2% when marijuana is excluded. (Health Canada 2015). In 2013, 9.4% of 
Americans reported illicit drug use within the past month, and fewer than 3% reported past-
month use of illicit drugs other than marijuana (NIDA 2015b).
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support for a policy does not guarantee that the policy will be advanced by 
a governing party or passed into law.7 Still, it is within the power of 
democratically elected governments to end prohibition, and its persistence 
results at least in part from its continued support among the electorate. 
Were ending the injustice of prohibition an important enough issue for 
enough voters, it would have greater political traction. Moreover, those 
jurisdictions that have liberalized their drug laws have largely done so as a 
result of political pressure from their citizens. Seven of the eight American 
jurisdictions that legalized recreational cannabis did so as the result of a 
majority vote on a ballot initiative (i.e. via plebiscite);8 the Canadian 
government’s plans to legalize cannabis in the first half of 2018 would fulfil 
a promise made by the governing Liberal Party in the course of the 2015 
election campaign; and, of course, the 1933 passage of the 21st Amendment 
to the US Constitution, which repealed the prohibition of alcohol, was the 
result of a 2/3rds majority vote of both Houses of Congress.9
Because the criminal law is under democratic control, the citizens of 
states that prohibit drugs – all of them, and not merely drug users – are in 
an important sense responsible for the harms that result from the drug 
trade. Those harms are the result of policies enacted by democratic 
institutions and so in principle expressing the considered views of the 
public. While the connection between majority policy preferences and the 
content of the law is far from straightforward, there is nevertheless an 
important sense in which ending prohibition is within the control of the 
American public; it simply requires repealing some criminal laws and 
passing some news ones, something that is entirely within the power of 
democratically elected governments who are responsive to the publics 
that elected them. That this is extremely unlikely reflects in part the fact 
that a significant proportion of the American public endorses the War on 
Drugs and the harms that it creates, and this tacit endorsement arguably 
makes that public complicit in the harms that prohibition generates. 
This institutional responsibility, however, is much less clear in the 
7 Thanks to an anonymous referee for urging me to discuss the relationship between 
majority preferences and policy changes in democratic contexts.
8 Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Washington, 
and the District of Columbia all legalized marijuana through majority vote on a proposition 
appearing on the ballot. The sole exception thus far is Vermont, which did so via a bill 
introduced in the state legislature, rather than via ballot initiative. 
9 It’s worth noting, however, that the 21st Amendment is the only constitutional 
amendment to secure the required ratification by three fourths of the states through the 
use of one-off state conventions rather than by passage in state legislatures. It therefore 
stands alongside the use of ballot initiatives to legalize marijuana as an example of the 
ways in which majority policy preferences are not always easily secured through legislative 
means.
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example of sweatshop labor. Global economic institutions are not under 
the direct democratic control of the citizens any particular country: in 
fact, many such institutions often are not under any centralized control at 
all, and are certainly not constrained significantly by democratic control. 
Democratically elected governments can choose – at significant cost – to 
opt out of some of those institutions, but even if they do so those institutions 
continue to be in force and to wield significant power. So individual 
consumers in wealthy nations are far less responsible for the workings of 
those institutions. 
Moreover, the political institutions of garment-producing nations like 
Bangladesh also bear some responsibility for lax labor standards and 
enforcement. That is not to say that there is nothing we can do, of course, 
but the enforcement of global labor standards is much less subject to 
democratic control than the content of domestic criminal law. While we 
cannot just change the global economic order by voting to do so, we can 
change the criminal laws of our state through straightforward democratic 
means, as was done in Portugal and several American states. Our ability to 
reduce the harms of the drug war through democratic means makes us 
more morally responsible for the persistence of those harms. 
3.2 Privilege
We all have a reason not to consume unethically produced consumer 
goods. But just as we can satisfy this responsibility by purchasing fair trade 
and organic food and clothing, perhaps we can do the same with drugs: 
home-grown and ethically sourced marijuana, for example, would avoid 
many of the concerns raised above. I will return to this objection in Section 
5.1, below. However, even if we concede the possibility of ethically sourced 
drugs, there is an additional moral reason to refrain from drug use that 
applies to many – though not all – drug users. The freedom to use illegal 
drugs without significant fear of criminal sanction is one expression of 
white middle-class privilege. Given the extreme racial disparity in the 
enforcement of drug laws, it is arguably among the more powerful forms 
such privilege can take. 
White, middle-class, university-educated North Americans can 
typically purchase and consume illicit drugs safe in the knowledge that it 
is very unlikely that they will be stopped by police, searched, arrested, 
charged, or convicted. African-Americans, however, are more than four 
times as likely as white Americans to be arrested for drugs, despite using 
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drugs at roughly the same rates (Mitchell and Caudy 2015).10 A drug charge 
also has the potential to be much more costly for a low-income American 
than a middle-class one; the loss of public housing, welfare, or food stamps 
is a non-issue for white professional home-owning drug users, but is a 
significant risk for low-income drug users. That African-Americans are 
more likely than white Americans to be poor compounds the potential for 
injustice, as they are more likely to be arrested for drug crimes, and more 
likely to suffer significant hardship as a result of such an arrest. Not only 
are they much more likely to be arrested for drug use that affluent white 
drug users, but such arrests can easily make them homeless.  
The ability to violate the law and use drugs involves much less risk for 
some citizens than for others. This inequitable treatment is unfair, and is 
directly generated by prohibition. As with the harms of drug production, 
the main way of ending the unfair privilege in drugs is by repealing 
prohibition. Nonetheless, while the unfairness exists, the exercise of such 
privilege is something those who have it have a moral reason to avoid. 
At the very least, those who use drugs recreationally and who have the 
privilege to do so without significant fear of sanction ought to both endorse 
and actively work toward the end of prohibition. Drug users who do not 
take a public stance in favor of ending prohibition show themselves to be 
willing to accept a privileged de facto immunity that they are unwilling to 
extend to others. They therefore treat the interests of others as less 
deserving of concern than their own. This powerful and morally 
objectionable form of hypocrisy is on display any time someone is willing 
to blithely break the law and yet not object to – or, worse, actively endorse 
– the prosecution of others who break the same laws.11 This hypocrisy 
would be objectionable even in the absence of racial bias in the enforcement 
of drug laws. Given the existence of such bias, those who are privileged 
enough to be largely free from fear of drug-related arrest or prosecution 
should refrain from the use of illegal drugs. 
4. THE PARADOX OF DRUG LAWS
Thus far I’ve made two distinct arguments. First, existing drug laws are 
unjust. Second, illegal drug use is unethical. These two arguments appear 
to be in tension, since it seems that I am arguing that both drug prohibition 
10 More precisely, African-Americans of 25 and under are somewhat less likely than 
whites to use drugs, while those 26 and older are somewhat more likely to use drugs; this is 
sometimes called the “racial age crossover effect” (Mitchell and Caudy 2015). 
11 R. Jay Wallace offers an account of the moral blameworthiness of hypocrisy along 
these lines in (Wallace 2010)
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and drug use are unjust. But, one might think, if laws banning drugs are 
unjust, then shouldn’t we conclude that there’s in fact nothing immoral 
about drug use? 
One straightforward way of resolving this tension would be to appeal to 
the existence of a general moral obligation to obey the law in a just state, 
even in cases where we believe the law to be unjust. John Rawls, for example, 
argues that, provided the injustice does not exceed certain limits, in just 
states we “normally have a duty to comply with unjust laws in virtue of our 
duty to support a just constitution.” (1971: 311). There are several arguments 
for such an obligation, drawing on the tacit consent of those subject to the 
law (Locke 1988), the importance of general obedience in securing the 
many valuable benefits of a just state (Wellman 2001), or principles of 
fairness and the unfairness of free-riding within generally just social 
institutions (Rawls 1999). As Rawls puts this point, provided that “the 
constitution is just and that we have accepted and plan to continue to 
accept its benefits, we have both an obligation and a natural duty… to 
comply with what the majority enacts even though it may be unjust”. 
Justice, he argues, “binds us to a just constitution and to the unjust laws 
which may be enacted under it” (1999: 180).
However, many theorists reject the idea that there is a general obligation 
to obey the laws of a just state (e.g. Wolff 1970, Raz 1984, Simmons 2001). 
We may have strong moral reasons to conform with just laws, but this does 
not mean that the law itself gives us any such reasons. Rather, the law, 
when it is just, tracks what we have independent moral reason to do. When 
those reasons exist, we should do what the law requires, but not for the 
reason that the law requires it. And when no such independent reasons 
exist, the law typically does not create one, particularly when there are 
independent moral reasons not to comply with the law. As Joseph Raz puts 
it, the purported moral obligation to obey the law “is at best redundant” 
(1984: 140). ‘At best,’ because it would only make a difference when there 
are no independent reasons to do what the law commands, and so, if taken 
seriously, could easily lead people to act in ways that are unjust. 
This suggests two distinct perspectives on obedience to unjust laws. 
Either we have an obligation to obey them in virtue of their being laws, or 
else their injustice means that, since we have no independent reason to do 
what they require, we have no obligation to obey them. However, the case 
of unjust drug laws represents an interesting exception to this general way 
of carving up the conceptual terrain. Because the drug laws are unjust, 
there are no independent reasons justifying those laws that explain why 
we ought to obey them. Nonetheless, the existence of the drug laws creates 
a strong moral reason not to use drugs, a reason that is entirely independent 
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of any general moral obligation to obey the law.
To say that unjust laws create moral obligations to obey them might 
seem paradoxical without appeal to a general obligation to obey. However, 
this paradox is only apparent. Existing drug laws are unjust because they 
impose significant harms on many vulnerable people, and these harms 
could be greatly reduced by ending prohibition. These same reasons 
explain why illegal drug use is unethical. That is, the production and 
distribution of drugs is so harmful precisely because it is illegal, and these 
very same harms explain why consuming drugs is unethical. Drug laws 
both create the conditions for violence and exploitation, and make possible 
the kind of systematically racist enforcement that makes recreational drug 
use by privileged individuals morally troubling. In both cases, then, the 
reason that drug use is unethical is because of the existence of laws 
prohibiting drugs. 
So while prohibition makes it unethical to consume drugs, the mere 
fact that drug use is against the law does not carry any moral weight at all. 
Rather, it is the unjust conditions created by the existence of the laws, and 
not the laws themselves, that make recreational drug use unethical, and 
these very same conditions explain why prohibition is unjust. 
Those, like Raz, who reject the existence of a general obligation point 
out that a law is just if there are independent moral reasons to do what it 
commands. However, drug prohibition is an example of an unjust law that 
we have independent moral reasons not to violate. Of course, these reasons 
are independent only in the sense that it is not the existence of the law qua 
law that gives us a moral reason not to violate the law. In a different sense, 
the existence of the obligation is highly dependent on the existence of the 
law, since the law creates the conditions – violence, exploitation, and 
biased enforcement – that make the activity of drug use deeply ethically 
troubling. So while the claim that the injustice of the law creates the moral 
obligation to obey it sounds paradoxical, the paradox dissolves when we 
recognize that the injustice of the drug law does not explain the existence 
of the obligation to conform to it. Rather, both the injustice and the 
obligation are explained by the existence of the violence, exploitation, and 
discrimination that the law brings into being. 
5. OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
5.1 Ethically sourced drugs
The analogy between drugs and low-cost clothing suggests a possible 
defense of recreational drug use. The existence of unethical low-cost 
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clothing is clearly not a reason to forego clothing altogether. Rather, it is a 
reason to purchase ethically sourced clothing, even if that clothing is more 
expensive. By the same token, the existence of unethically sourced drugs 
may not be a reason to avoid drugs altogether: instead, it simply gives drug 
users a strong reason to choose ethically sourced drugs. Homegrown 
organic marijuana, for example, seems to avoid concerns about the 
harmful and exploitative drug trade raised above. 
There are two points to make in response to this suggestion. First, while 
it is true that ethically sourced drugs would certainly be better than 
unethically sourced ones, there simply are no ethical sources for many 
recreational drugs. Cocaine and heroin, for example, are not grown in 
North America or Europe, and as a result need to be smuggled from Asia 
and South and Central America. Drugs smuggled in this way are part of the 
violent and exploitative global trade, for which recreational users are in 
part responsible. Moreover, even drugs produced in North American and 
Europe – such as marijuana and synthetic drugs like MDMA and crystal 
methamphetamine – are often produced and distributed by the same 
violent and exploitative criminal organizations that distribute cocaine 
and heroin, and the people who produce them are not protected by labor 
laws. While marijuana and many synthetic drugs might, in principle, be 
ethically sourced by discreet small-scale producers who treat their 
employees well and who avoid violence, users who buy such drugs will 
typically have no way of knowing where their drugs come from, and so no 
way of knowing whether it is linked to such violent and exploitative drug 
markets. 
Second, while those who grow their own organic marijuana or produce 
their own synthetic drugs strictly for personal use can avoid being 
implicated in many of the harms of the drug trade, they may nonetheless 
participate in the unethical exercise of privilege. While the exploitative 
source of most drugs is a reason to avoid them, so too are the unequal and 
unjust ways in which prohibition affects underprivileged groups. In fact, 
even the ability to produce one’s own drugs without fear of detection can 
require access to space and privacy that members of underprivileged 
groups often lack: a homeowner can more easily produce drugs at home 
than a renter, for example. 
One thing this argument suggests is that members of vulnerable and 
underprivileged groups who consume ethically sourced drugs do not 
behave immorally, since their drug use is not an example of unethical 
privilege. That is consistent with the argument advanced above, which 
does not depend on the claim that there is anything about drug use itself 
that is immoral. It is the nature of the drug trade and the privilege implicit 
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in much illicit drug use that makes it morally objectionable. Illegal drug use that 
avoids both of these objections might not be open to moral censure. However, 
the vast majority of recreational drug use does not fall into this category. 
5.2 Civil disobedience
Civil disobedience is a powerful way of protesting unjust laws, and one that 
is endorsed even by those, like Rawls, who defend the general obligation to 
obey the law. Since prohibition is unjust, drug use is arguably a form of 
protest against that injustice, and so counts as an instance of civil 
disobedience. 
While civil disobedience is a morally admirable way of seeking to overturn 
unjust laws, it does not work as a defense of recreational drug use. First, 
drugs purchased to be used for the purposes of civil disobedience would still 
be unethically sourced, and so users remain implicated in the harms of the 
drug trade. Second, and more importantly, typical private recreational drug 
use does not count as an example of civil disobedience, which requires 
publicly breaking the law, doing so with the aim of communicating a political 
message or bringing about a change in the law, and willingly accepting the 
accompanying punishment (Rawls 1971, Brownlee 2004). Perhaps taking 
drugs in full view of the police at a public anti-prohibition rally counts as an 
instance of civil disobedience, and so of morally permissible drug use. 
Typical recreational drug use, however, does not.
5.3 Medical uses of drugs
Many people use drugs for a range of health-related reasons, so another 
objection is that my argument unfairly blames people for using medicines 
for which they have a legitimate need. This includes drug use by addicts, 
but also includes other uses: people self-medicate with a variety of drugs to 
treat chronic pain, nausea, anxiety and depression, to combat the side 
effects of prescription medication, and for a range of other non-recreational 
reasons. 
I accept that the medical use of drugs is different in important ways. It 
would indeed be unfair to blame those with a legitimate medical need for 
drugs for using them, including addicts, particularly when such users are 
not responsible for the ban on drugs and are in fact among those most 
affected by that ban. My argument addresses the recreational use of drugs 
for the sake of the pleasure they deliver. In fact, a recognition of the 
difference between medical and recreational uses is at the heart of one of 
the main exceptions to prohibition: the legal regulation of medical 
marijuana in many jurisdictions. Such programs generally provide users 
with both legal protection from prosecution and an ethical source for 
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marijuana. A similar recognition justifies the common practice of 
prescribing methadone – otherwise an illegal drug – to opiate addicts. 
Again, this practice provides addicts with both legal protection and an 
ethically sourced product, while also addressing the health costs of drug use. 
However, not every person who uses illegal drugs for medical reasons 
uses marijuana or opiates, or even has access to legal medical marijuana or 
methadone. Those who have a legitimate medical need for drugs but do 
not have access to a legally sanctioned supply do indeed use drugs that are 
produced in unethical ways. In their case the blame more properly falls on 
the law-makers who are responsible for depriving people of medically 
necessary drugs, rather than on those who have the need for those drugs. 
Recreational users lacking a legitimate medical reason for drug use, 
however, remain blameworthy for the unethical use of illegal drugs. 
5.4 Drugs may continue to be unethical even if drugs were legalized
While the illegal drug trade is violent and exploitative, this does not mean 
that the legal trade in drugs would be an ethical one. After all, many 
perfectly legal consumer products are unethical, from cheap sweat-shop 
produced clothing and electronics to so-called conflict diamonds. 
Legalization is no panacea. While it might make it possible to provide 
ethical sources of marijuana and many synthetic drugs, drugs like cocaine 
and heroin would continue to be produced in the developing world by low-
wage workers, and such workers would likely remain vulnerable targets of 
exploitation. At best, legalization might make possible a market for 
(perhaps more expensive) ethical drugs, but it would almost certainly not 
do away with unethically produced drugs. The realities of production and 
distribution in even a legal drug trade might mean that many drugs would 
continue to be unethical.
It is certainly true that legalization would not instantly make drug use 
ethical, and that many drugs might continue to be unethically produced 
and distributed even if prohibition were repealed. However, this is 
consistent with the argument advanced above: recall that it is not the mere 
illegality of drugs that makes them unethical, but the conditions created 
by that prohibition. To the extent that those conditions remained in place 
after prohibition was lifted, the argument would remain in force. 
Prohibition would make it possible for recreational drug use to be ethical, 
but it certainly would not guarantee it. But even if most drugs continued to 
be produced and distributed by vulnerable exploited workers, legalization 
would likely secure some degree of improvement in their working 
conditions, simply by making legal oversight and regulation possible, and 
by reducing the incentives for violence. Such improvements might not be 
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enough to make drug use ethically unproblematic, but they could 
nonetheless be significant. 
5.5 Prohibition is justified 
I have argued that drug prohibition is unjustified, in large part because of 
the enormous social costs that it imposes. But perhaps this is a mistake. 
For example, perhaps the costs of prohibition – in lives lost, workers 
exploited, rights sacrificed, and people incarcerated – are worth it to keep 
drugs out of the hands of children, to secure an overall reduction in drug 
use, or to convey society’s profound disapproval of drugs.12 Or perhaps the 
problem with the drug war is in the execution, not in the general approach. 
The current heavily punitive approach to drug crime may be ill conceived 
and enforced in a discriminatory manner, but this does not necessarily 
show that prohibition itself is unjust. Rather, it might show that prohibition 
ought to be pursued in less harmful and discriminatory ways.  For example, 
justice might require reforming policing practices, eliminating mandatory 
minimum sentences for non-violent drug offences, or diverting those who 
commit such offences into alternatives to the prison system. While 
prohibition is enforced in discriminatory ways, the problem may not be 
prohibition so much as racism; after all, even perfectly just laws can be 
unjustly enforced. African-American drivers are much more likely to be 
stopped and searched than white drivers (LaFraniere and Lehren 2015) – a 
phenomenon known as ‘driving while Black’ – but that does not mean that 
traffic laws are unjust. Rather, it simply means that they are often enforced 
in a discriminatory way.
It may be that, were drugs not currently illegal, it would be unjust to 
introduce prohibition. But it may be a distinct question whether we ought 
to repeal prohibition, given that it is place. After all, even if we would have 
been better off had drugs never been prohibited, repealing prohibition 
might still make things worse. Many of those involved in the illegal drug 
trade would not transition directly into the legal drug trade, which could 
draw from a larger labour pool and which would have less need for 
smugglers and enforcers. So an end to prohibition might well leave many 
criminals unemployed and without their main source of income, and such 
criminals might respond by turning to other crimes, thus making crime 
worse (Rios 2012). Perhaps this is not relevant to the justification of 
prohibition, since some would argue that incarcerating people for 
12 Peter de Marneffe argues that the prohibition of heroin is justified in order to 
secure an overall reduction in harm, and in particular to protect children, though he agrees 
with Husak that most other drugs should be legalized (de Marneffe 2005). See also (Bean 
2008: 262-266).
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recreational drug use is necessarily unjust, regardless of whether repealing 
prohibition would lead to an increase in harms. But lawmakers interested 
in adopting policies that reduce the harms of drugs might justifiably 
choose to continue with prohibition even if they recognize that it is an 
imperfect policy that would not be implemented if it were not already in 
place (Wolff 2011: 78).
Whether prohibition is ultimately justified, however, does not affect the 
argument that illegal recreational drug use is unethical.  If it turns out that 
the laws prohibiting the use of drugs are just, then that of course is a reason 
to follow them, since we have a moral reason to comply with laws that are 
just.  My argument shows that we have moral reasons not to violate the 
drug laws even if they turn out to be unjust, and this is perfectly consistent 
with insisting that prohibition is just and that, as a result, drug use is 
unethical. 
My argument would, however, lose some of its paradoxical appeal if it 
were true that drugs prohibition is ultimately justified. I have argued that 
prohibition makes the drug trade harmful and exploitative, and so makes 
drug use unethical. If it turned out that ending prohibition would not 
reduce the misery associated with the drug trade, then arguably prohibition 
itself would turn out not to create the conditions that makes drug use 
unethical. But this would be because those harmful conditions would 
continue to obtain in the absence of prohibition, and my argument is that 
it is the harmful conditions in which drugs are produced and distributed, 
and not the mere fact that they are illegal, that makes drug use unethical. 
Regardless of whether prohibition is just, then, the use of prohibited drugs 
remains unethical. 
5.6: Drinking alcohol during prohibition
There is a clear and oft-noted analogy between the current prohibition of 
drugs and the prohibition of alcohol in the United States between 1920 and 
1933. One potential objection to my argument, then, is that it would 
strongly suggest that drinking during prohibition was immoral, even 
though prohibition itself is now widely recognized as a mistake and the 
moderate consumption of alcohol is morally unobjectionable.
It’s worth noting that drinking was not illegal during prohibition, as the 
18th Amendment and the Volstead Act outlawed the production, 
distribution, and sale of alcohol, but not possession and consumption. So 
to the extent that the argument in this paper addresses the ethics of illegal 
drug use, it may not apply at all to drinking during prohibition. 
Moreover, the alcohol example could only serve as an objection to the 
 Just Say No (For Now): The Ethics of Illegal Drug Use 27
LEAP 5 (2017)
argument that illegal drug use is unethical if it were obviously true that 
drinking during prohibition was morally licit, and that is far from certain. 
Some of the arguments offered in this paper also apply to drinking during 
prohibition, and so do show that such drinking may well have been 
unethical. In particular, both the violent and illegal black market and the 
exploitation of workers outside the protection of the law were moral 
problems that faced prohibition-era recreational drinkers who drank 
bootlegger-sourced alcohol. Those objections do not apply to the wealthy 
Americans who were able to rely on private reserves of alcohol stockpiled 
before the introduction of prohibition, but this legal and ethical access to 
alcohol was a privilege that was denied to the vast majority of Americans. 
So as with drug prohibition, the risks and harms of alcohol prohibition 
were far from equally distributed. In such a context continuing to drink 
while at the same time supporting prohibition arguably constituted an 
objectionable form of privileged hypocrisy. 
Drinking in the absence of prohibition may well be entirely 
unobjectionable, but then so too would be many cases of recreational drug 
use. So our current attitudes toward the ethics of drinking and the error of 
alcohol prohibition are perhaps best understood as suggestive of what 
ethical drug laws would look like, rather than as an objection to the argument 
that drug use under prohibition is unethical.
6. CONCLUSION
Existing drug laws are unjust, and cause considerable harm; we should work 
to overturn them. One might therefore be inclined to conclude that such 
laws do not deserve our respect, and so that we are free to violate them. This, 
however, would be a mistake. The ban on drugs may be unjust, but while 
they are banned it is immoral use them. Drug use is immoral because of the 
conditions created by the law, rather than because of the law itself. The very 
facts that give us a strong moral reason to conform to the law therefore also 
give us reason to overturn it. 
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